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In spite of its impressive development at the level of treaty law and soft law, international 
environmental law remains a weak and under-developed body of law. This is due especially to the 
persistent institutional “deficit” and lack of compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms that hamper 
effective monitoring and implementation of environmental standards.  To overcome these limits, in a 
perspective that avoids wishful thinking, such as the project of an “international court for the 
environment”, and the hard realism of an unfettered sovereignty over the natural resources, this paper 
argues for a “realistic utopia” that recoups the original idea of the natural environment as a “common 
good”. Congruent with this idea is the re-discovery of the category of erga omnes obligations to be 
administered in the interest of the international community as a whole. At the normative level, this 
entails a re-conceptualisation of “sovereignty” in terms of responsible exercise of state powers over 
natural resources located in the national territory and over activities capable of impacting on the global 
environment,   so as to make such exercise responsive and functional to the achievement of the goal of 
conserving the quality of the environment that sustain our life.  At the institutional level this approach 
invites two responses: rejection of the need for reform of global institutions and reliance instead on 
market mechanisms of self-regulation and transnational private enforcement; or a search for reform of 
the institutional system of environmental governance in view of creating effective multilateral 
institutions that can mirror what has been done in other areas of international law, such as trade, 
investments and human rights. This paper argues that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
They should be complementary because the first one can hardly work without the other. 
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Realism, Utopia and the Future of International Environmental Law 
1. Introduction 
If one looks at the contemporary scene of international environmental law, three basic features stand 
out as elements capable of influencing future developments of this law, both as a distinct branch of 
international law and as a legal discipline: (i) the meaning and role of ‘sustainable development’, a 
concept that for more than twenty years has been at the heart of diplomatic and judicial efforts at 
reconciling environmental protection with the demands of economic growth; (ii) the increasing 
polarization of the academic debate and judicial practice around the dilemma of environmental 
protection versus scientific and technological advancement; and (iii) the continuous search for an 
institutional framework to ensure environmental governance in a world of increasing economic and 
social interdependence. The most serious weakness of international environmental law is the lack or 
deficiency in enforcement mechanisms. Other branches of international law have proved helpful in 
some instances. The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute-settlement Panels and especially the 
Appellate Body have occasionally reconciled their responsibility to guarantee the observance of the 
specific obligations arising for the member states under the WTO agreements with the need to give 
proper consideration to the legitimate goals pursued by member states in protecting their local 
environment or even the general environment beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction. Other 
times, however, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has been impervious to claims of environmental 
sustainability and has mechanically applied WTO rules even in the face of legitimate environmental 
concerns raised by the rigid implementation of free trade rules. In the field of investment law 
progressive incorporation of environmental issues within the sphere of investment arbitration has 
taken place in the past ten years.  Human rights courts and monitoring bodies have increasingly paid 
attentions to the environmental dimension of human rights, when environmental degradation threatens 
health, private and family life, and even the very right to life, The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
has had the opportunity to adjudicate an increasing number of cases with a distinct environmental law 
dimension. However, international environmental law, in spite of its impressive development at the 
level of treaty law and notwithstanding the abundance of soft law instruments, declarations, and 
‘understandings’, remains an immature and underdeveloped body of law. What are the prospects for 
further developments? At the normative level, a ‘realistic utopia’ entails the recouping of the original 
promise of the environmental movement, that is the conceptualization and the legal treatment of the 
natural environment as a ‘public good’ to be administered in the interest of all and of the generations 
to come. At the institutional level two approaches are possible: (i) consciously to shun the need for 
institutional reform as too costly and ineffective and rely on market mechanisms of self-regulation and 
transnational private enforcement and (ii) a reform of the institutional system of environmental 
governance by creating effective multilateral institutions that can mirror what has been done in the 
international economic law and human rights. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. They 
should be complementary because the first one can hardly work without the other. 
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2. The Method 
Even imaginative thinking about the future of international environmental law requires a method. The 
method I have chosen in this paper combines two of the fundamental elements of a legal order: 
stability and dynamic evolution. Stability requires that we avoid the extremes of virtuous models of 
environmental protection based on pure rationality and on abstract ethical considerations divorced 
from the hard realities of international power and economics.  Dynamic evolution entails consideration 
of the capacity of the international legal order of self-renewal when faced with new challenges, as in 
the case of environmental degradation. Such renewal or progressive reform seldom occurs by way of a 
radical change in the fundamentals of the legal order, which, in the case of international law, are its 
persistent state-centred nature and the decisive role of sovereignty. While real and resilient, these 
fundamental features of international law are progressively modified by the increasing role of non 
state actors, including NGOs, individuals, business corporations and civil society at large, which in 
multiple ways contribute to norm creation and adjudication in the field of environmental law.  In this 
complex reality and in the consequent dynamics between stability and progressive reform we can 
understand the negative attitude of those who after more than 40 years of environmental law making 
question the identity of environmental law as a legal discipline and its maturity as a distinct branch of 
the law.1  This scepticism seems justified in light of the glaring failures to prevent the continuous 
degradation of the natural environment and inability to reach consensus on what system of 
environmental governance should be set up to tackle global environmental problems such as climate 
change.  On the positive side, however, the language of environmental law is increasingly penetrating 
into every aspect of our economic, social, and cultural life. Environmental considerations are 
becoming more and more relevant in the process of international adjudication in areas of international 
economic law and human rights2. Innovative methods of law making have emerged and new forms of 
enforcements, such as non-compliance procedures, are being experimented.  Paradoxically, the 
growing awareness of the importance of environmental preservation for our life and welfare seems to 
go hand in hand with the perception of a decline and failure of environmental law. 
To grasp this complex reality and at the same time to steer a path for future progress, the best approach 
is to begin with  a retrospective analysis of the achievements and shortcomings of international 
environmental law and then try prospectively to set out, hopefully as a ‘realistic utopia’, a path for  
reform and innovation. This approach fits also this writer’s conviction that any imaginative leap 
forward can only come from a full comprehension of the past, from the awareness and state of mind 
that combines ‘wisdom and youth’.3 
                                                     
1
 E. Fisher, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford, and Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about 
Environmental Law Scholarship’, 21 J Env L (2009) 213–50, with a response by R. Macrory. 
2
 See below Section 4.  
3
 I borrow these felicitous words (in English in the original Italian text) from Cesare Pavese, who in his diary (12 June 1939) 
observed that ‘La vitalità creatrice è una riserva di passato. Si diventa creatori—anche noi—quando si ha un passato. La 
giovinezza . . . è una ricca vecchiaia (genius is wisdom and youth)’, Il mestiere di vivere (Turin: 1962), 148. 
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3. The Acquis 
There is general agreement that the origin of international environmental law—that is, the branch of 
international law dealing with the protection of the natural environment—can be traced to the early 
1970s with the organization by the United Nation of the first conference on international law and the 
environment and the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.4 The 
Stockholm Declaration contained innovative elements and had the potential for progressive 
development of international law. It contributed to the consolidation of the idea that the conservation 
of the environment is a concern of the international community, thereby removing environmental law 
from the narrow confines of private law regulating reciprocal relations between neighbouring states.5 
It gave substance to the novel concept of erga omnes obligations, enunciated just two years earlier in 
the famous dictum of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona Traction case.6 It 
proclaimed the responsibility of every state to prevent damage to the environment, not only of other 
sovereign states but also of the common environment beyond the bounds of national jurisdiction.7 It 
linked the safeguarding of environmental quality to fundamental rights and human dignity and to the 
duty ‘to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations’.8 
The wave produced by the Stockholm Declaration in the 1970s and 1980s led to the adoption of the 
first generation of treaties and conventions dealing with the protection of the environment. Among 
them one can recall innovative treaties, such as the World Heritage Convention,9 which combines the 
protection of cultural and natural heritage of outstanding importance; the Washington Convention on 
trade in endangered species;10 the MARPOL system on the prevention of marine pollution from ships 
and Part XII of the Law of the Sea Convention;11 the Geneva Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution;12 and the evolving system of protection of Antarctic fauna and flora.13 
These and many other treaties adopted in this period have contributed to the emergence of some 
general principles of environmental protection, as well as to the consolidation of international 
environmental law as a discrete area of legal study and research. At the same time, there is no denying 
that this first wave of legal instruments presents some significant defects and shortcomings. With few 
exceptions,14 these legal instruments address environmental problems following a sector-by-sector 
approach, resulting in a multiplication and fragmentation of legal regimes, which does not take into 
account the interdependence of various elements of the biosphere and the need for an ecosystem 
approach to the preservation of environmental quality. Another weakness is the inadequate integration 
of environmental standards into economic development policies. To this, one has to add the systemic 
                                                     
4
 Adopted 16 June 1972, 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
5
 Trail Smelter Arbitration (Canada-US), 16 April 1938–11 March 1941, RIAA Vol. III, pp 1905–82. 
6
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Ltd, judgment, ICJ Reports, pp 3ff, paras 33–4. 
7
 Principle 21. 
8
 Principle 1. 
9
 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, adopted by the UNESCO General 
Conference on 16 November 1972. For the text and analytical commentary see F. Francioni with F. Lenzerini (eds), The 
1972 World Heritage Convention—A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
10
 Adopted 3 March 1973, 12 ILM 1085 (1973). 
11
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (with following Protocol and Annexes), 21 ILM 
1319 (1973); UNCLOS, 21 ILM 1261 (1982). 
12
 Adopted 13 November 1979, 18 ILM 1442 (1979). 
13
 See Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System, US Department of State, especially chs X and XI. 
14
 One such exception is the Canberra Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, which 
inaugurated the so-called ‘ecosystem approach’ to the conservation of fisheries in the Antarctic seas, see Handbook, ibid, 
at fn 13. 
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avoidance in this first generation of environmental treaties of ‘secondary rules’ on liability for breach 
of the substantive obligations to respect and protect the environment.15 
A second wave of international environmental law coincides with the emergence of global ecological 
issues at the end of 1980s and with the Earth Summit that led to the Rio Declaration of 1992. This was 
the era of the discovery of the relentless erosion of the ozone layer and of the adoption of the related 
Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on the control of substances that deplete the ozone 
layer;16 of the emergence of global warming as a scientific, political, and economic issue, with the 
attendant adoption of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change17; and of the 
perception of biodiversity degradation as a ‘common concern’ of humankind.18 Increased awareness 
about the dangers posed by the irreversible degradation of the environment spurred in this period the 
emergence of the ‘precautionary approach’ in its twofold expression as a radical ban on activities 
deemed to be harmful to the environment—as in the case of the 1991 Madrid Protocol on the 
protection of the Antarctic environment19—and, in its moderate form, as an obligation to provide a 
prior assessment of the foreseeable environmental impact of planned industrial, technological, and 
scientific activities. 
Another important feature of environmental law in this period is the ‘constitutionalisation’ of some 
fundamental principles in regional economic integration in systems, notably the European Community 
and later in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the former, the Single European 
Act of 1987 first and the Maastricht Treaty later gave the status of fundamental norms to several 
principles, including not only the already mentioned precautionary approach, but also the principle of 
prevention, the ‘polluter pays principle’, and the principle of correction of adverse environmental 
impacts at the source, which provide the ‘constitutional’ framework for the development of one of the 
most advanced systems of environmental legislation in the world. 
As already pointed out in the introduction, today three basic features stand out as elements capable of 
influencing future developments of environmental law both as a distinct branch of international law 
and as a legal discipline. 
The first concerns the meaning and role of ‘sustainable development’, a concept that for more than 
twenty years has been at the heart of diplomatic and judicial efforts at reconciling environmental 
protection with the demands of economic growth. As we shall see later, this concept, in spite of its 
initial indeterminacy, is increasingly acquiring a normative content. This is especially reflected in the 
arbitral and adjudicatory practice of the past ten years. 
The second feature is the increasing polarization of the academic debate and judicial practice around 
the dilemma of environmental protection versus scientific and technological advancement. In no other 
area has this dilemma caused as much friction and disagreement as in the field of commercial 
application of biotech products, which has provided a fertile field of disputes before the World Trade 
                                                     
15
 The well-known example of deliberate avoidance of liability and responsibility implications in the footnote attached to the 
Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 13 November 1979 (reprinted in 18 ILM 1442 
(1979)) which explicitly declares that it does not cover issues of responsibility. 
16
 Montreal Protocol of 16 September 1987, reprinted in 26 ILM 1550 (1987), additional to the Vienna Convention on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, ibid, at 1529. 
17
 Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 1992, reprinted in 31 ILM 849 (1992). 
18
 See the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992, reprinted in 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
19
 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Handbook, above n 12, Art. 7 of which establishes a ban on 
mineral resource activities in Antarctica for a period of 50 years from the entry into force of the Protocol, with the 
possibility of further extension, thus reversing the earlier decision of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to proceed 
with opening Antarctica to mineral activities and adopting a specific convention aimed at regulating such activities. See 
the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, adopted in Wellington, June 1988, 
Handbook, above n 12. 
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Organization (WTO),20 the EU courts,21 and national courts. Beyond the technical aspects of the legal 
dispute over the extent of free trade and the applicability of the precautionary approach, looms a more 
radical clash between the different world views of those who, on the one hand, see traditional methods 
of agriculture and local control over food production as an essential condition for the preservation of 
environmental quality and socio-cultural cohesion, and of those who, on the other hand, support the 
progressive industrialization of agriculture and downplay the risk of putting food production in the 
hands of a few biotech companies which control the chain of agricultural production. 
The third feature one has to consider is the continuous search for an institutional framework to ensure 
environmental governance in a world of increasing economic and social interdependence. Some 
limited progress has been achieved by the establishment of quasi-institutional arrangements in global 
environmental treaties—such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer. These arrangements, 
although they fall short of amounting to a traditional international organization with distinct legal 
personality, have produced Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and Meeting of the Parties which ensure 
continuity in the implementation of the environmental standards and monitoring of the parties’ 
compliance with the treaty obligations. At the same time, innovative solutions have been introduced in 
this embryonic institutional setting to deal with cases of failure by state parties to abide by treaty 
obligations, short of specific procedures to enforce international responsibility and liability. I am 
referring to the alternative methods (alternative to liability) introduced with the so-called ‘non-
compliance procedures’, which entail the examination by ad hoc treaty bodies (the non-compliance 
committees) of cases of suspected or ascertained breach by state parties of treaty standards or 
commitments with a view to assisting in redressing the wrongful conduct rather than to enforcing 
liability or securing some form of reparation. 
 
4. The Context 
Given this origin and this less than robust evolution, what is the place of environmental law within the 
larger context of international law today? The answer to this question is that, surely, environmental 
law has become an established branch of international law—in the sense that it is constituted of a 
coherent set of norms having the common goal of establishing obligations for states and other actors in 
the international community to respect and protect the environment. At the same time, unlike other 
areas of international law that have undergone a dynamic evolution, such as human rights and 
international economic law, international environmental law remains an incomplete body of law. This 
is due to various factors. 
First, the object of protection remains elusive. It is not easy to find general consensus over what 
constitutes a ‘safe’, ‘healthy’, or ‘good’ environment. This uncertainty hinders the consolidation of 
general principles and norms laying down precise obligations for states and other international law 
actors to respect, protect, and redress the environment. In addition, even after 40 years of 
development, international environmental law is still comprised mainly of treaties and soft law 
instruments, with the consequence that even in relation to global issues such as climate change and 
biodiversity degradation, regulatory gaps persist due the inability to co-opt important actors within the 
relevant treaty system. 
But the most serious source of the weakness of international environmental law is the lack or 
deficiency in enforcement mechanisms. In other areas of international law, such as the already 
                                                     
20
 See the the Biotech dispute between the EU and the United States, Argentina, and Canada, Dispute Settlement Body, Panel 
report of 29 September 2006. 
21
 See, eg, Commission v Poland, ECJ (Second Chamber), judgment of 16 July 2009. 
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mentioned human rights and international economic law, the progressive development at the 
normative level has been accompanied in the past half-century by a parallel development of dispute-
settlement institutions and enforcement procedures. 
In the field of human rights law this has led to the constitution of regional courts—notably, the 
European,22 American,23 and African24 Courts of Human Rights—and of quasi-judicial treaty bodies 
competent for the supervision of state compliance with treaty obligations.25 The existence of 
enforcement procedures, sometimes open to individual applications, has proved to be not only a 
guarantee of the effectiveness of the law; it has provided the platform for the elucidation of the law, its 
jurisprudential development into a living body of norms and principles beyond the bare skeleton of the 
constitutive treaty. It is thanks to this jurisprudential development that today we can speak of a true 
‘international legal order’ of human rights protection. This legal order is constantly renewed and 
refined thanks to inter-judicial dialogue and comparative analysis of different adjudicatory 
experiences. This feature contributes in no small measure to the universality of international human 
rights law. 
The ethical and legal strength of the human rights jurisprudence has positively reflected upon the 
protection of the environment. This has happened by way of the development of an ‘environmental 
dimension’ of human rights through an expansive interpretation of the human rights obligations 
incumbent upon state parties to the relevant conventions. The European Court, in particular, has made 
extensive use of Article 226 and Article 8,27 concerning respectively the right to life and the right to 
private and family life, to extend the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights to 
persons exposed to hazardous industrial and technological activities incompatible with the respect of 
such rights. It has developed the concept of ‘positive obligations’ of state parties effectively to enforce 
legal, administrative, and judicial measures designed to prevent or remedy harmful environmental 
interferences by private parties with the sphere of protected rights. Further, in the absence of specific 
treaty provisions, the Strasbourg Court has fashioned a procedural requirement of information and 
consultation with affected parties as a condition for the fulfilment of the obligations arising under 
specific human rights provisions, such as Articles 2 and 8.28 Similar development can be found in the 
system of American Convention on Human Rights29 and of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.30 
In the field of international economic law the ‘weakness’ of traditional norms on trade and 
investments has been overcome by the setting up of a worldwide system of dispute settlement and 
arbitration. In the domain of trade, such system is guaranteed by the compulsory and binding dispute 
                                                     
22
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended) 213 UNTS 221. 
23
 American Convention on Human Rights, adopted 22 November 1969 and entered into force, 18 July 1978, 1144 UNTS 
123. 
24
 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 26 June 1981, with its 1998 Protocol establishing an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG//MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1Rev 2 (1997). 
25
 The United Nations Human Rights Committee , established pursuant to Article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights is competent, under its additional optional Protocol, to receive and consider  communications from 
individuals  - subject to the jurisdiction of a State Party – who claim to be victims of a violation of the rights seth forth in 
the Covenant. For the text of the Covenant and of the additional Protocol, 999 UNTS 171.  
26
 Oneryildiz v Turkey, App. no. 48939/99, judgment of 18 June 2002. 
27
 Lopez Ostra v Spain, App. no. 16798/90, ECtHR, Series A, no. 303C; Guerra v Italy, App. no. 14967/89, ECtHR Reports 
1998-1, 210; Fadeyeva v Russia, App. no. 55723/00, Judgment of 9 June 2005, ECtHR Reports 2005-iv, 255. 
28
 For a detailed analysis of this case law, see F. Francioni, ‘Human Right in an Environmental Horizon’, 21 EJIL (2010) 41 
at 48ff. 
29
 See the ground-breaking judgment in Mayagma Sumo Awas Tngni Community v Nicaragua, IACHR Series C, no. 79, 31 
August 2001. 
30
 Social and Economic Rights Action Center v Nigeria, Case N0 ACHPR/COO/AO44/1, OUA Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5. 
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settlement procedure of the WTO, which is binding upon the overwhelming majority of the states 
controlling the world economy. In the field of investments, compulsory and binding arbitration is now 
a permanent feature of bilateral investment agreements, national laws, regional agreements such as 
NAFTA,31 and of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the 
1965 World Bank Convention.32 It is hardly necessary to recall that, with respect to investment, the 
‘strength’ of the law is further guaranteed by the possibility for private individuals and entities to bring 
claims directly against the host state of the investment. This possibility has spurred a vast 
jurisprudence and arbitral practice that has contributed to the consolidation and strengthening of 
international investment law especially in the period following the end of the Cold War and the almost 
universal acceptance of free movement of capital as a vehicle for economic growth and development. 
 
5. Asymmetries and Imbalances 
The asymmetry between international environmental law and these other areas of international law, 
besides disclosing the weakness and deficiencies of the former, produces further distortion and 
imbalances, especially with regard to the area of international economic law. 
In this field, the lessons drawn from the WTO dispute-settlement practice and from international 
investment arbitration are particularly instructive. 
As for the WTO, since the establishment of the new organization in 1995, many commercial disputes 
involving the legitimacy of national measures to protect the environment have been drawn within the 
sphere of the adjudicatory competence of the Dispute Settlement Body. This is quite understandable, 
since the WTO provides a compulsory system of dispute resolution and gives binding force to the 
rulings adopted on the basis of the Panels’ and Appellate Body’s findings. However, the absence of a 
comparable universal forum competent to adjudicate on the environmental law aspects of international 
disputes inevitably influences the normative perspective in which such disputes are adjudicated. That 
normative perspective is trade law, and more precisely the relevant WTO agreements, which is the 
applicable law of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Thus the very existence of a strong system of 
international enforcement of trade rules exerts a powerful attraction and influence with regard to the 
settlement of disputes which arise or are related to questions of environmental law, for which no 
international forum is normally available. 
In some instances, the WTO dispute settlement Panels and especially the Appellate Body have wisely 
taken upon themselves the complex task of reconciling their responsibility to guarantee the observance 
of the specific obligations arising for the member states under the WTO agreements with the need to 
give proper consideration to the legitimate goals pursued by member states in protecting their local 
environment or even the general environment beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction. This task 
has been accomplished by resorting to the interpretive tool offered by Article 31(3)(c)33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,34 by an expansive interpretation of the general exceptions under 
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),35 and by giving relevance to the 
                                                     
31
 North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11, ILM ___. 
32
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, Washington, 18 March 
1965. 
33
 This Article lays down the general rule of treaty interpretation and provides that: 3. There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context . . . . (c) any relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
34
 Signed in Vienna, 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1153 UNTS 331. 
35
 See Shrimps and Turtle case, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, extending the application of the ‘exhaustible 
natural resources’ exception (Art. XX(g)) to living resources of the sea, and Brazilian Retreaded Tyres, finding that 
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Preamble of the WTO constitutive treaty. The first clause of the Preamble recognizes, as one of the 
purposes of the organization, the need to conduct trade and economic relations ‘in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to preserve and protect the environment’. 
Other times, however, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has been impervious to the consideration of 
environmental sustainability and has mechanically applied WTO rules even in the face of legitimate 
environmental concerns raised by the rigid implementation of free trade rules. The apex in this attitude 
can be found in the notorious Biotech case36 involving the claim by the United States and other 
countries that the precautionary procedure adopted by the European Community (now European 
Union) for the authorization of the import and marketing of genetically modified products amounted to 
a violation of the WTO obligations because of the undue delay in the administrative procedure 
followed in the authorization process. In spite of the fact that the EU procedure was motivated by 
legitimate environmental and health concerns and that it was prima facie consistent with the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, binding on the EU and other parties to the dispute, the ruling of the Panel 
concluded that the precautionary approach followed in the EU procedure would not justify departure 
from the timely observance of the obligations arising from the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement because the United States was not a party to the Cartagena Protocol. That Protocol’s 
relevance as a legal tool to interpret the applicable WTO rules could be justified, in the opinion of the 
Panel, only in the event that all members of the WTO were also parties to the Protocol. 
It is regrettable that this ruling has never been challenged before the Appellate Body because it is 
wrong in terms of law and unacceptable in terms of sound environmental policy. From a strictly legal 
point of view, since WTO obligations are typical reciprocal obligations binding on member states in 
their mutual relations, the Panel should have recognized that the Cartagena Protocol was applicable in 
the relations between the EU and any other disputing parties which were also parties to the Protocol. 
This is consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 30(3) and (4). A 
different solution could have been reached for those disputing parties which (like the United States) 
were not parties to the Cartagena Protocol. From a policy point of view, a more appropriate solution 
would have been to try to accommodate the legitimate environmental and health concerns of the EU 
with the rules of the game applicable to the free movement of goods. This is the approach followed in 
more advanced regional economic integration systems, such as NAFTA, with its side agreement on 
environmental cooperation, and the EU, where the Court of Justice has always assessed the legality of 
measures entailing restrictions to the free circulation of goods to the twofold test of (i) the measure’s 
necessity to accomplish a legitimate environmental goal and of (ii) the proportionality of the 
measure’s impact on trade with the environmental goal pursued.37 At the same time, this approach 
would have been more consistent with the emerging principle of ‘mutual supportiveness’ between 
trade liberalization and environmental protection which is already codified in a number of important 
normative instruments of recent adoption and the function of which is clearly to avoid or minimize the 
risk of fragmentation of international law.38 
In the field of investment law a similar phenomenon of progressive incorporation of environmental 
issues within the sphere of investment arbitration has taken place in the past ten years. Even more 
frequently than in the field of trade, regulatory measures adopted for the purpose of environmental 
protection have given rise to investment disputes because of the direct or indirect impact that such 
(Contd.)                                                                  
environmental and health considerations may justify the adoption of an import ban on retreaded tyres. See Panel report 
WT/DS 332/R (12 June 2007) and Appellate Body Report WT/DS 332/AB/R (17 December 2007). 
36
 European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS 293/R (29 September 2006). 
37
 See the seminal case, Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark, European Court of Justice, decision of 20 September 1988. 
38
 For a timely analysis of the principle of mutual supportiveness and of its role in resolving conflict between WTO norms 
and environmental norms, see Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law Making: A 
Watershed for the “WTO-and-Competing Regimes” Debate’
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measures were deemed to produce on the rights of the investor. One may recall that the first claim 
brought before an investment panel under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA Agreement, Metalclad,39 
concerned a bitter dispute between a US investor who had planned the construction of a landfill for the 
disposal of hazardous waste in Mexico and the local government of the Mexican State of San Louis de 
Potosí, which strenuously opposed the use of its land for such purpose. In the end, the adoption by the 
local authorities of an administrative decision declaring the area that included the planned site for the 
landfill to be a nature reserve, and thus not susceptible to industrial development, triggered the 
investor’s request for arbitration and led to an award adverse to Mexico. The environmental decision 
to designate the area as a nature reserve was deemed to be an interference with the property rights of 
the US investor, thus giving rise to an obligation to pay compensation.40 Similarly, in the Santa Elena 
arbitration,41 the measures adopted by Costa Rica in order to enlarge a nature reserve in compliance 
with international obligations arising under the UNESCO World Heritage Convention were not 
deemed sufficient to exclude the liability of the government to pay compensation to the US investors 
for loss of investment opportunity in a tourist development project. The arbitral award in this case 
went so far as to reject that even the amount of compensation could be equitably affected by the 
legitimate environmental goal pursued by Costa Rica. 
More recent arbitral practice, and the growing concern that investment arbitration may go too far in 
reviewing legitimate national regulation under the international parameter of investor’s rights, has led 
to a more cautious attitude and to the opening of investment arbitration to environmental 
considerations. Two recent cases are especially relevant in this context. In Glamis Gold,42 a Canadian 
mining company had brought a complaint against the United States under NAFTA Chapter 11 on 
investment protection because of the alleged damage to its property rights and economic interests as a 
consequence of the adoption of regulatory measures both at the level of state law and federal 
regulation (Department of the Interior). Such measures were aimed at regulating the environmental 
impact of gold mining, particularly at ensuring proper rehabilitation of the land after extraction 
activities, taking into account also the rights of native tribes for whom the territory targeted for mining 
represented protected ancestral land. In its 2009 arbitral award, the NAFTA Panel concluded that the 
environmental legislation adopted by the United States, even if it had some adverse impacts on the 
investor’s economic interests, could not be considered in breach of NAFTA investment obligations 
because it pursued a legitimate public interest and did not disclose any discriminatory treatment. 
Similarly, in an earlier case, Methanex,43 the United States was confronted with a complaint by a 
foreign company engaged in the production of a fuel additive banned under legislation passed by the 
State of California—a state whose record of cutting-edge legislation in the field of environmental 
protection is well known—because of its polluting effects on ground water. The complaining company 
claimed loss of property rights, loss of market share, and discriminatory treatment because of the 
alleged unfair advantage that the new environmental legislation would give to US producers of 
alternative fuel additives. Again, the legitimate goal pursued with the environmental legislation, its 
abstract and general character, and the open and democratic process of its adoption, which also 
involved proper evaluation of independent scientific advice, led to an arbitral award favourable to the 
United States. 
These are modest steps towards the desirable goal of a full integration of environmental considerations 
in the settlement of economic disputes. But they remain precarious steps because environmental 
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protection in WTO dispute settlement and in investment arbitration comes only as an exception to the 
rule, which is the enforcement of the economic rights of states and of investors. 
This raises the question of the role of the ICJ, as a court of general jurisdiction, in the development 
and consolidation of international environmental law. 
 
6. The International Court of Justice 
In spite of the unhappy ending of the ‘environmental chamber’, which was never utilized and was 
finally abolished in 2006, the ICJ has had the opportunity to adjudicate an increasing number of cases 
with a distinct environmental law dimension. In the well-known 1997 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case,44 
the Court had to adjudicate a complex dispute between Slovakia and Hungary arising from Hungary’s 
refusal to follow up on a Communist-era project involving the construction of a series of dams on the 
Danube. In its judgment, the Court recognized the binding nature of the obligation to prevent damage 
to the environment,45 thus reaffirming a principle already enunciated in the Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.46 At the same time, the Court elaborated at length 
on the importance of the principle of sustainable development as a legal tool to couple economic 
development and the protection of environmental quality. Yet, when the Court came to address the 
question of whether the adoption of measures which are necessary to preserve the environment may 
justify non-compliance with prior treaty obligations (as maintained by Hungary), the answer was 
negative. The Court preferred to shun the uncertain path of progressive development of international 
law, as outlined in the bold Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, and disappointingly reiterated 
traditional principles of the law of treaties and of state responsibility. No wonder that this has provided 
little help to settle the dispute, which remains pending 14 years after the judgment. 
In the recent case Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay,47 concerning a typical transborder environmental 
dispute between Argentina and Uruguay, the Court has correctly focused on the importance of 
procedural obligations, which include disclosure, consultation, negotiation, and environmental impact 
assessment prior to the initiation of a planned industrial project, but in the end the judgment does not 
mark any significant progress in the elucidation and consolidation of general international law on 
environmental protection. This is so essentially for two reasons. First, the judgment is based 
exclusively on specific treaty commitments undertaken by the disputing parties with respect to the 
management and conservation of the shared resources of the river Uruguay.48 Secondly, despite the 
positive approach taken by the Court in clarifying the procedural obligations incumbent upon a state 
planning or authorizing49 industrial activities in a transboundary context, in the end the judgment falls 
short of providing a meaningful connection between the breach of such procedural obligations and the 
substantive obligation to prevent environmental damage. On the contrary, the Court somewhat 
artificially separates the procedural and substantive obligations, and the ascertained breach of the 
former seems to have no influence—in the reasoning of the Court—on the latter. Furthermore, the 
Court did not deem reparation necessary for the breach of procedural obligations: the finding of the 
wrongfulness of Uruguay’s conduct in this respect was considered sufficient satisfaction for 
Argentina. This may be formally correct. However, in environmental disputes such as this, where 
complex questions of scientific evidence are posed to the Court, it may not be a good judicial policy 
                                                     
44
 Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, pp 7–84. 
45
 Ibid, para. 53. 
46
 Opinion of 8 July 1996, para. 29 available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>. 
47
 Judgment of 20 April 2010. 
48
 Treaty of Salto of 26 February 1975 establishing the Statute of the River Uruguay, UNTS Vol. 1295, N. I-21425, 340. 
49
 In this case the potential environmental impact originated from a foreign private investment. 
Realism, Utopia and the Future of International Environmental Law 
11 
rigidly to separate the procedural and the substantive dimensions of environmental obligations. 
Procedural obligations of prior impact assessment, notification, and consultation are meant to avoid a 
fait accompli and to address environmental concerns before damage occurs. Therefore they are in a 
close functional relationship with substantive obligations to respect and protect the environment. Thus 
their breach should entail a careful scrutiny of the way in which the breach affects the overall conduct 
of the parties and their degree of compliance with substantive obligations. The approach followed by 
the Court risks giving an incentive to be negligent or even wilfully to ignore procedural environmental 
guarantees in the expectation that once the planned works are realized, the procedural breach will not 
affect the legality of the project and no meaningful sanction or obligation to provide reparation will 
ensue.50 
 
7. Reclaiming Legal Imagination 
The above analysis  confirms the initial assessment of this paper that international environmental law, 
with its main focus on “primary obligations” arising  from  treaties , declarations and 
‘understandings’,51  remains  weak on the side of “secondary obligations” and  implementations  
mechanisms.  The implementation ‘deficit’, and more specifically the lack of a strong generalized 
enforcement mechanism entails, on the one hand, reliance on voluntary procedures of non-compliance 
verification, and, on the other hand the ‘incidental’ enforcement of environmental standards by 
compulsory mechanisms of dispute settlement established for the adjudication of other specialised 
areas of international law, and, on rare occasion, by the ICJ. This comes at a price. The main price is 
the lack of coherent jurisprudential development and its insufficient integration into the adjudication 
of international economic disputes, as well as the lack of a systemic character of international 
environmental law adjudication. 
Can international law develop into a more mature and effective system of environmental governance, 
similar to the one which has evolved in the field of international economic law and, to a lesser extent, 
of human rights? The answer to this question depends on how much in the epistemological assessment 
of the observer the balance will tilt on the side of utopia or on the side of hard realism. In any event, 
for the purpose of the present analysis, I think it is necessary to distinguish between two different but 
interconnected perspectives: the normative perspective and the institutional perspective on the future 
of international environmental law. 
 
(A) The Normative Perspective 
At the normative level, a ‘realistic utopia’ on the future of international law entails the recouping of 
the original promise of the environmental movement, that is the conceptualization and the legal 
treatment of the natural environment as a ‘common good’ to be administered in the interest of all and 
of the generations to come. The innovative project of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration was that of the 
progressive consolidation of a body of norms and principles governing the collective action of states 
and other international actors with the goal of safeguarding the essential elements of the environment 
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as a ‘common  good’, including water, air, climate, and the biosphere. From a legal point of view this 
agenda brought to the fore the very idea of erga omnes obligations, that is, obligations of solidarity of 
each towards all, of individual states towards the international community as a whole. The crisis and 
the decline of international environmental law go hand in hand with the failure of this original idea. 
Very little solidarity has materialized in this respect in the almost 40 years that have passed since the 
Stockholm Declaration. The adjudication of environmental disputes, as illustrated above, has provided 
little contribution to the elaboration of international environmental law as a system of erga omnes 
obligation. On the contrary, despite some abstract declarations of principle, the technique of 
adjudication has systematically followed the traditional path of reciprocal obligations—mainly arising 
from treaty law—binding the disputing parties in their mutual relations, with hardly any consideration 
of the collective dimension of the international community interest. 
However, it would be wrong to attribute to the shortcomings of international adjudication the sole 
responsibility of the failure to give legal form to the need for collective action in the environmental 
field. The main responsibility lies with the major economic powers, which have pursued their national 
economic interests and their agenda of unsustainable growth by effectively withholding global 
environmental matters from the realm of international relations for which legally binding regulation is 
acceptable. This attitude may change under the pressure of the global environmental crises. However, 
the persistent refusal by the major economic actors, such as the United States and China, to adhere to a 
scheme of mandatory emission limits under the Kyoto Protocol or other internationally agreed 
mechanism, and their continuing reluctance to undertake legal commitments in the post-Kyoto agenda, 
does not facilitate the emergence of a new solidarity—which has contributed to the Copenhagen 
demise and to the inconclusive results of the 2010 Cancun meeting. 
 Legal scholarship in the field has not been of much help either in overcoming these normative limits 
of international environmental law. Study and research in environmental law and policy have 
proliferated, giving rise to countless specialized journals, books, and even specialized law faculties.52 
But this has produced an increasingly fragmented scholarship, overspecialized in distinct areas of the 
law, self-concluded and self-referential, with a strong ‘militant’ attitude and yet unable to bring the 
environmental value to the top of the globalization agenda, where economic growth and development 
still dominate.53 This does not mean that study and research in the field of environmental law have not 
influenced policy-making at the level of international negotiations and within competent 
intergovernmental organizations. In this respect the influence has been significant and, together with 
scientific expertise and non-governmental organization (NGO) activism, has provided the necessary 
support to specific lawmaking initiatives and environmental regimes.54 However, judging from the 
results obtained by the environmental law community in terms of overall progress of international law, 
the conclusion is inevitable that doctrinal elaboration in this field has remained confined within the 
horizon of state sovereignty as the seat of the power to make environmental decisions. Sovereignty 
and democratic decision-making within the nation-state provide the political–legal framework for the 
legitimation of environmental measures that restrict human freedom. The will of the majority may 
override individual interests. But this framework presupposes the persistence of people’s loyalty to 
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national institutions and interests, primarily economic interest, rather than a loyalty to a remote 
‘international’ public interest in the preservation and protection of the general environment. It is this 
state-centred perspective that has hindered the passage of the idea of erga omnes obligation from a 
purely theoretical concept to a practical legal tool codifying the commitment of every state actively to 
engage in the promotion and protection of environmental quality as an essential public good. The 
shortcomings of international legal scholarship in facilitating this passage are revealed in the 
International Law Commission Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts,55 where even the expressions ‘environment’ and ‘erga omnes’ obligations are avoided and the 
hypothesis of state responsibility for breach of an obligation owed to the international community as a 
whole remains marginal and confined to Article 48(1)(b). 
Placing the idea of the environment as an international ‘common good’ at the centre of a hypothetical 
agenda of ‘realistic utopia’ entails certain legal implications. 
First, it is necessary to reconsider critically certain categories of past international law, such as 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. It is clear that if such a concept was justifiable in the 
wake of de-colonization to allow newly independent states to recoup control over their natural 
resources, today it may not be used to justify an irresponsible use of such resources, especially when 
this happens under the pressure of the insatiable demand of industrial production that leads to the 
unsustainable use of air, water, and minerals, within the legal framework of international investment 
law and trade liberalization. 
Secondly, the idea of the environment as an international common good illuminates the limits of the 
economic theories that tend to reduce the natural world to a pure economic resource to be submitted to 
the logic of the market. This logic has gone very far in recent years. Hand in hand with the 
development of knowledge in the field of molecular biology, it has supported the claim to the 
propertization of genetic resources, both as a channel of information and as material valuable for the 
production of goods and services. This race to the enclosure of the most intimate essence of the natural 
world, our genetic patrimony, reduces life itself to merchandise to produce profit. It makes us lose the 
sense of what is the common good.56 This enclosure cannot be morally justified, as in the past, with 
the need to increase productivity for the benefit of humankind, since the world today experiences an 
excess of production of goods but an uneven and inequitable distribution of them among the peoples 
of the earth. 
This last point introduces the third and perhaps most important implication of our idea of the 
environment as an international common good. That is the necessity of looking at the environment 
also as a dimension and an essential condition for the enjoyment of human rights. As indicated in 
Section 4 above, the connection between environmental protection and human rights has already been 
captured in the case law of human rights courts. But this practice eludes the essential nature of the 
environment as a public good: it remains confined within the traditional conception of human rights as 
individual rights. In this perspective, forms of environmental degradation become relevant only to the 
extent that they amount to unlawful interferences with the sphere of human rights of a single 
individual claimant.57 Today, such an individualistic approach is no longer adequate to counter the 
tendency to subtract essential components of the natural environment, such as water, from the public 
domain and treat them as tradable commodities. Nor can it effectively contend against the many 
unsustainable forms of pollution that affect the general environment in an indeterminate and diffused 
form, with risks for the health, integrity, and life of people at large and not just single individuals. This 
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is made evident by the current debate about access to water as a fundamental right of every person, a 
right that would be foolish to consider in a purely individualist dimension, since it is the fundamental 
component of our life and of the functioning of society as a whole.58 It is made evident also by the 
emerging human rights implications of the worsening of global warming with its devastating effects in 
terms of desertification, flooding, and environmental disasters that affect the enjoyment of 
fundamental human rights of entire peoples and not only of single persons. 
 
(B) The Institutional Scenario 
As I have pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the insufficiency of global institutions for the 
monitoring of environmental compliance and the lack of compulsory mechanisms of dispute resolution 
are the true Achilles’ heel of the present system of international environmental law. 
To overcome this deficit two approaches are possible within the perspective of a progressive 
development of the law. The first approach would consciously shun the need for institutional reform as 
too costly and ineffective, and would rely on market mechanisms of self-regulation and transnational 
private enforcement. The second approach would entail a reform of the institutional system of 
environmental governance by creating effective multilateral institutions that can mirror what has been 
done in the other areas of international law examined in this chapter, namely international economic 
law and human rights. 
It is the opinion of this writer that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. They should be 
complementary because the first one can hardly work without the other. The reason is simple. 
International–transnational private regulation (e.g. trade in emission allowances, the clean 
development mechanism, and forest conservation), however effective it may be, intrinsically operates 
outside the sphere of state control, and in the long term it may pose an undesirable challenge to the 
very idea of sovereignty over the national territory and its resources. Besides, a ‘realistic utopia’ 
approach cannot ignore the bitter lesson of the contemporary financial crisis, the decline of 
confidence, or sheer market failure of the ‘private’ self-control mechanisms, and the contemporary—
shift of focus back to the role of the state in regulating and controlling essential aspects of economic 
and social life in its relation to the vital components of the earth’s environment. 
For this reason, it is necessary to re-examine de lege ferenda what kind of improvements are needed 
and are politically feasible in order to modernize and strengthen the institutional framework of 
environmental governance. In this respect, an opportunity for institutional reform and for improved 
global environmental governance was offered by the 2005 UN reform. Several critical issues were on 
the table at that time, and had been clearly articulated also with the support of academic studies and 
research.59 In the end, however, the 2005 UN mini-reform did not produce any meaningful 
improvement to the UN architecture of global environmental governance, and the institutional deficit 
remains unresolved at a time when we are facing the most dangerous of environmental threats, climate 
change. 
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How can imagination contribute to the improvement of the institutions of global environmental 
governance? 
The simplest way would be to proceed with the strengthening of the existing institutions, in particular 
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). This was the route which was indicated by the 
UN Secretary-General in his 2005 Report on the reform of the UN system60 and which UNEP itself is 
exploring at the time of writing.61 This route is certainly still feasible. However, to yield a reasonable 
expectation of effective improvement, certain functional conditions should be kept in mind. 
First, if UNEP were to remain a ‘programme’ as it is today, it would need to rely on adequate, 
predictable, and stable funding. This is not the situation today. From the mid-1990s funding has 
declined, both because of creeping dissatisfaction of some major contributing countries and because of 
increasing competition by other UN programmes, such as the United Nations Development 
Programme, which has an important role in promoting environmental sustainability. 
Secondly, an enhanced role of UNEP would be possible only to the extent that it is given real authority 
and operational capacity with regard to the mounting complexities of the threats to the global 
environment. Since the time of its creation, following the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the UNEP 
mandate has been quite limited. It was meant to provide monitoring of environmental developments, 
serve as a ‘clearing house’ for environmental information, and provide impetus and coordination for 
the development and implementation of international environmental agreements. UNEP has performed 
these functions quite well; in some respects it has outperformed its original mandate, notably in its 
normative role as a sponsor of a great variety of multilateral environmental agreements ranging from 
hazardous waste to trade in dangerous chemicals, air pollution, land degradation, regional seas and 
water resources management. Today, however, it seems that it has stretched to its limits, and it is 
doubtful that more authority and enhanced operational capacity can be achieved without institutional 
reform and substantial upgrading. 
This brings us to the examination of the second option, that is, the creation of a new environmental 
organization. This project could be pursued in two alternative directions. One would be the creation of 
a UN environmental agency, which would be an organization endowed with its own legal personality 
but placed within the UN system. The other alternative would be the creation of an independent world 
environmental organization on the model of the WTO with a distinct membership, secretariat, and 
implementing mechanisms. In spite of the intrinsic differences between these two models, they have in 
common several advantages. First, they would place the current system of international environmental 
governance on a more stable institutional basis. Secondly, they would bring under the same 
institutional umbrella the vast and diversified array of multilateral environmental agreements which 
today are served by sector-specific and often competing secretariats. Thirdly, they could work as a 
catalyst for stronger environmental solidarity and for the development of a fiduciary spirit among 
participants in view of greater coherence in the efforts for environmental protection. Finally, they 
could provide a single forum for global environmental monitoring, an issue that is acutely felt in the 
current post-Kyoto negotiations on climate change, and for dispute settlement. 
There is no hiding that the creation of any of these environmental organizations would entail the 
investment of enormous political capital, in terms of limitations of national sovereignty necessary to 
establish a system of effective multilateral cooperation. It would entail also technical obstacles linked 
to the intractable issue of the reform of the UN Charter, or to the adoption of a new multilateral treaty, 
for which complex negotiations would be required. But that would also be an opportunity for a fresh 
approach involving in the negotiation process not only states, but also relevant UN agencies and 
programmes, the main secretariats of multilateral environmental agreements, the World Bank, the 
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private sector, and the leading environmental NGOs. This is not an easy task. But I see no easy 
solution to the daunting challenge posed to the international community by the global environmental 
crisis. This is time to rebuild consensus, not to drift in the hope that something good will come from 
the “creative” destruction of the planet. 

  
 
